Likhu -1

77 MW · operating · on the Likhu Khola · in Solukhumbu, Okhaldhunga, and Ramechhap districts. The largest plant in the Likhu Cascade (213 MW combined across 4 plants).

Summary

Likhu-1 is a 77 MW operating run-of-river hydropower project on the Likhu Khola in Solukhumbu, Okhaldhunga, and Ramechhap districts. It is the largest plant in the 213 MW Likhu Cascade and the first MV Dugar–Mogha Energy project to reach operational scale in this basin. The page tracks it as a cascade leader with an 80/20 take-or-pay PPA structure, using the current CARE Nepal credit-rating source set.

Specifications

Sources

• Likhu Cascade Research Compilation

Specifications (CARE Nepal / DoED data)

The Cascade Leader

Likhu-1 is the largest plant in the 213 MW Likhu cascade, and the only one with a better-than-standard PPA structure: 80% of contracted energy on take-or-pay terms (versus 75% at Likhu -2). This means the developer carries less revenue risk from NEA curtailment — a meaningful protection in a cascade where the New Khimti substation bottleneck stranded 40% of Likhu-2's generation in FY 2023/24.

The plant diverts 26.4 m³/s through a 5.25 m weir and a 6.57 km headrace tunnel to a surface powerhouse equipped with horizontal Francis turbines from Andritz Hydro. At 77 MW, it is the largest plant in the cascade and the second-largest private RoR IPP in the Likhu basin after the MV Dugar Group's 77 MW completed this project while simultaneously developing Likhu-2 and Likhu Khola A — a cluster investment model that concentrated three SPVs under shared equity and shared construction management.

Financial Recovery

Likhu-1's credit trajectory tells the same transmission-bottleneck story as Likhu -2, but from a better starting position:

• FY 2023/24 (commissioning year): constrained by the same New Khimti substation bottleneck that limited the entire cascade. CARE Nepal assigned a BB rating.
• FY 2024/25: following the 200 MVA transformer upgrade, the corridor unblocked. Operating income reached NPR 1,060 million. CARE upgraded the rating to BB+ in March 2025.

The BB+ rating is below Likhu-2's BBB- — reflecting higher leverage or lower debt service coverage. But the upward trajectory mirrors the cascade pattern: the asset performs when the grid permits.

The MV Dugar FDI Model

Likhu-1, Likhu-2, and Likhu Khola A share a common equity architecture: the MV Dugar Group (a Nepali conglomerate) paired with Mogha Energy DMCC, a UAE-based investment firm. This FDI structure — a domestic group clustering multiple projects under shared foreign capital — is a departure from Nepal's traditional single-project domestic bank consortium model.

Butwal Power Company (BPC) holds no equity in any cascade plant. The market misattribution (BPC as cascade developer) persists because BPC's subsidiary HCEL provided engineering consultancy during construction. The actual equity is MV Dugar + UAE FDI.

For the UAE investors, the Likhu cluster offers a risk-diversified entry: three projects (77 + 55 + 29 = 161 MW cumulative under Dugar control) share the same river basin, the same transmission corridor, and the same regulatory regime — but operate as separate SPVs with separate PPAs and separate debt. If one underperforms, the other two are not legally affected. This structuring is standard for the Dugar approach and represents a model other Nepali conglomerates could replicate.

Transmission Dependency — The Single Corridor Risk

All four cascade plants share one evacuation route: the New Khimti substation into the Khimti–Dhalkebar 220 kV line. When the substation had only a 100 MVA transformer, the entire 213 MW cascade competed for approximately half its rated corridor capacity. The 200 MVA upgrade (late 2023) resolved the immediate bottleneck — but the structural vulnerability remains: a single substation fire, 220 kV line fault, or transformer failure returns the entire cascade to stranded-generation status.

Following the upgrade, NEA secured Central Electricity Authority (CEA) approval to wheel power from Likhu-2 and Likhu-4 across the Dhalkebar– Muzaffarpur 400 kV interconnector into the Indian day-ahead market. This transformed the same corridor that caused stranded generation in 2023 into a dual-market export pathway — domestic dispatch in dry season, Indian export in monsoon surplus. See Buildability.

Limitations & Controversies

The current page is strongest on credit-rating and cascade-level context from CARE Nepal disclosures. It does not independently verify final design parameters, construction-phase quality records, current operating performance month-by-month, or environmental/social compliance status beyond the existing source set. The single-corridor evacuation risk is documented at the cascade level but not quantified against real-time grid capacity.

See also

• Likhu -2 — downstream 55 MW plant, stranded generation case study
• Buildability — transmission planning failure as structural IPP risk
• Q-Design Discharge — cascade performance vs design energy
• Stranded Generation — the grid evacuation bottleneck problem
• PPA Pricing — the take-and-pay revenue risk at the cascade level
• Koshi Basin — basin context for the Likhu Khola system
• Khimti–Dhalkebar 220 kV Hydropower Corridor — the 220 kV backbone the cascade depends on