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Film Evidence: Nepal Has Hydropower. Why Isn't It Enough?

Companion evidence page for TransparentGov's film on why Nepal exports electricity in the monsoon and imports it in the dry season, mapping each spoken claim to its wiki page, claim ID and primary source.

Page status
Working page
Updated
2026-11-04
Last reviewed
2026-11-04
Review due
2027-02-04

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Nepal Has Hydropower. Why Isn't It Enough? is a 16-minute TransparentGov film published on 2 October 2026. It asks why one electricity system exported about 552 GWh to India in Bhadra and imported about 357 GWh in Falgun of the same fiscal year, 2024/25. This page lists every factual claim the film makes, where the wiki covers it, and the primary source shown on screen.

The argument in brief

  1. The reversal is seasonal, not a one-off. In Bhadra, domestic generation of about 1,848 GWh exceeded demand of about 1,293 GWh. In Falgun, generation fell to 605 GWh against demand of about 1,013 GWh. See Seasonal Mismatch and Nepal's Core Hydro Problem Is Timing, Not Annual Volume (C-001).
  2. Headline potential is the wrong measure. Megawatts, gigawatt-hours, dependable megawatts and duration answer different questions. See Firm Power and Installed MW, Energy, Seasonality, and Firm Power Are Routinely Conflated (C-006).
  3. Daily pondage is not seasonal storage. Kali Gandaki A shifts about six hours a day; only the 106 MW Kulekhani cascade holds water across seasons. See PRoR Is Not Seasonal Storage (C-009) and Kulekhani Cascade.
  4. The fleet followed its incentives. Energy-priced contracts and stand-alone project packages favoured run-of-river and peaking run-of-river plants. See Operating Fleet Is Overwhelmingly RoR/PRoR, Not True Storage (C-005) and PPA Pricing.
  5. Reservoirs need many obligations to hold for years. Tanahu shows the delivery burden. See Tanahu Hydropower Project.
  6. Start from the dry-season order, not from a technology. Five jobs fill it: reduce, produce, shift, deliver and protect. See Storage Deficit, Solar–Hydro Complementarity and Transmission and Delivery Are Material Immediate Monetization Constraints (C-019).
  7. Contracts decide what is built. The 2082 reservoir directive separates declared available capacity from contract energy. See ERC Reservoir-Based Generating Station Electricity Purchase and Sale Directive 2082.

Claim-by-claim evidence

Time What the film says Wiki page Primary source shown Status
0:06 Bhadra FY 2024/25: about 1,848 GWh generated, about 1,290 GWh demand NEA Annual Report FY 2024/25 NEA Annual Report FY 2024/25, energy balance p.134 Matches source; 1,848 − 564 exported + 2 imported + 7 interrupted = 1,293
0:21 About 552 GWh exported in Bhadra Electricity Trade Time Series NEA Annual Report FY 2024/25, India trade chart p.137 Matches source; the energy-balance table gives 564 GWh, a difference inside NEA's own tables
0:28 Falgun: demand about 1,013 GWh, generation 605 GWh, about 357 GWh imported Seasonal Mismatch NEA Annual Report FY 2024/25, pp.134, 137 Matches source
1:06 83,500 MW is a theoretical estimate Hydropower Potential Categories, WECS Assessment of Hydropower Potential of Nepal (2019) WECS 2019, pp.1, 8, 117 Correct, but see the correction below on the 1966 study
1:46 Roughly 67–78% of annual flow arrives June–September, by basin WECS River Basin Plans and Hydropower Development Master Plan (2024) WECS 2024, p.20 (Koshi basin) Modelled basin shares; directional for other basins
2:45 MW, GWh, dependable MW and duration are distinct measures Firm Power, Installed MW, Energy, Seasonality, and Firm Power Are Routinely Conflated Definitions C-006 is rated medium pending primary re-grounding
3:25 Kali Gandaki A: 144 MW peaking run-of-river, six hours of daily peaking Kali Gandaki A NEA Annual Report FY 2024/25, PDF p.21 Matches source
4:57 Kulekhani I–III total 106 MW; Kulekhani I is the reservoir Kulekhani Cascade NEA Annual Report FY 2024/25, pp.13–16, 23 Matches source
5:14 106 MW is about 3% of about 3,910 MW in DoED's June 2026 operating register Operating Fleet Is Overwhelmingly RoR/PRoR, Not True Storage DoED operating register, 2 July 2026 Matches source (2.71%)
6:04 Private participation opened in 1990 WECS Assessment of Hydropower Potential of Nepal (2019) WECS 2019, p.8 Matches source
6:16 IPPs held 64% of installed hydro in 2024 and supplied over 70% of capacity added since 2018 World Bank Nepal Country Economic Memorandum (2025) World Bank CEM 2025, p.62 Matches source
7:20 The fleet is dominated by run-of-river and peaking run-of-river Operating Fleet Is Overwhelmingly RoR/PRoR, Not True Storage (C-005) World Bank CEM 2025; ERC/ECA paper 2025 High confidence for the structural claim; no exact national percentage is claimed
7:55 Tanahu (140 MW reservoir) is still under construction; ADB's 2013 plan estimated completion by end-2020 Tanahu Hydropower Project, ADB Tanahu Hydropower Project Documents (2026) ADB RRP (Jan 2013) p.9 Table 3; NEA AR p.94; DoED register Matches source
8:08 First headworks contract terminated; every bid in the next round rejected; replacement awarded 2021 Tanahu Hydropower Project NEA; Spotlight Nepal 22 Mar 2021; ADB data sheet 43281-013 Matches source; the termination date is not fixed
11:23 Two years of Nepalgunj measurements show useful solar in several hydro-weak months Solar–Hydro Complementarity, World Bank ESMAP Nepal Solar and Wind Resource Measurement World Bank/ESMAP 2020, Table 5 Single-site measurement; no dependable evening contribution is claimed
13:41 The standard tariff prices energy per kWh under wet and dry rates PPA Pricing ERC/ECA paper 2025, Table 1 (NPR 4.8 wet, 8.4 dry per kWh, 2017 run-of-river rates) Matches source
14:12 The 2026 directive distinguishes contract energy from capacity declared and kept available ERC Reservoir-Based Generating Station Electricity Purchase and Sale Directive 2082 ERC Reservoir Directive 2082, §§24, 31–34 English paraphrase of the Nepali text
15:24 Run-of-river projects helped end scheduled load-shedding Run-of-River Hydropower The Kathmandu Post, 14 May 2018 Matches source

Corrections

What the pictures do and do not show

  • Satellite views are dated Copernicus Sentinel-2 images. The Kulekhani sequence (25 Nov 2024, 5 Mar 2025, 24 Apr 2025) shows visible water extent, not volume or level.
  • Plant dots use DoED licence-area midpoints, not facility locations. The fleet-type map shows only the 44 plants (2,577 MW) whose hydraulic type is published in the sources checked. The other 169 plants (about 1,333 MW) are not typed.
  • Cross-border links and trade arrows are schematic, except the named Dhalkebar–Muzaffarpur 400 kV Cross-Border Interconnection 400 kV line. The 552 and 357 GWh figures are national monthly totals, not flows on that line.
  • The 24-hour load diagrams, the valley illustration and the Tanahu works illustration are schematic; their bars carry no data except where stated.

What the film does not claim

  • It does not say run-of-river plants were a mistake. They added energy and helped end load-shedding.
  • It does not name a single cause of the fleet mix. It describes incentives that made some paths easier to repeat.
  • It does not give a national dependable-capacity number or a dry-season deficit forecast. The "Falgun order" is a planning method, not a figure.
  • It does not show Tanahu as a national solution, or any combination of the five jobs as already contracted.

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